{"id":6615,"date":"2020-07-01T13:41:26","date_gmt":"2020-07-01T17:41:26","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/?p=6615"},"modified":"2020-07-01T16:09:50","modified_gmt":"2020-07-01T20:09:50","slug":"the-political-consequences-of-populist-health-crisis-management-the-political-economy-of-coronavirus-responses-in-hungary","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/2020\/07\/01\/the-political-consequences-of-populist-health-crisis-management-the-political-economy-of-coronavirus-responses-in-hungary\/","title":{"rendered":"The Political Consequences of Populist Health Crisis Management: The Political Economy of Coronavirus Responses in Hungary"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

by G\u00e1bor Scheiring, Marie Curie Fellow, Bocconi University,\nDepartment of Social and Political Sciences, Dondena Centre for Research on\nSocial Dynamics and Public Policy<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

How can we interpret the characteristic\nsteps of the Hungarian government to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic? What does\nHungary\u2019s example reveal about the political consequences of populist health\ncrisis management? How do political and policy effectiveness of health crisis\nresponses relate to each other under a populist government? A wide range of\nanalyses on populism highlight the centrality of personalism, anti-scientism,\nanti-elitism, and the resulting policy inefficiency as well as populists\u2019\ndesire to exclude cultural outgroups as factors. These might explain certain\nconsequences of populists in power. This essay offers a different,\npolitical-economic approach to populism and argues that there is a discernible\npolicy logic behind the government\u2019s responses that fit well into its\nsocio-economic strategy that unfolded over the past decade. Based on this\nframework, the most controversial responses of the Hungarian government prove\nto be efficient but unpopular policies that require politically efficient\nsolutions to curtail democratic feedback mechanisms to prevent a backlash from\nthe victims of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s illiberal populism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keywords<\/strong>: illiberalism, populism, health-crisis management, policy\neffectiveness, political effectiveness, authoritarian capitalism<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The coronavirus represents a challenge to\npolitical systems worldwide. A quick and efficient governmental response is\npivotal. However, it is widely recognized that some governments used the\npretext of health crisis management to centralize power more than others thus\nundermining democracy in the long run. Populist politicians and parties in\ngovernment proved to be particularly prone to democratic backsliding during the\ncoronavirus health crisis (Gilbert, 2020). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin\nNetanyahu ordered all courts to close, effectively postponing his own\ncorruption trial. President Duterte of the Philippines ordered officials to\nshoot \u2018troublemakers\u2019 protesting during the quarantine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In most parts of the world, this is a new\nphenomenon not only because of the novelty of the pandemic but also because\npopulists had been confined to the periphery of politics until recently,\nwithout being able to form government as a sole or majority governing party.\nTherefore, the overwhelming majority of the scholarly literature on populism\nhas so far focused on finding the adequate definition of populism, analyzing\nthe causes behind the rise of populist parties, and describing populist\nideologies and discourses. The literature on the consequences of populists in\npower, especially with regard to health, is scant. The coronavirus health\ncrisis presents a natural case study to examine the consequences of populism in\npower under stress. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hungary is an avant-garde case of\nilliberal, authoritarian populism in Europe (Boz\u00f3ki & Heged\u0171s, 2018; Kalb,\n2018). Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s Fidesz has established a stable illiberal government\nafter 2010. The government has used the coronavirus health crisis to enact new\nmeasures that further centralize power and eliminate checks and balances that\ncould potentially counterbalance the executive (Boz\u00f3ki, 2020; Szombati, 2020).\nIn addition to further \u2018executive aggrandizement\u2019 (cf. Bermeo, 2016), Viktor\nOrb\u00e1n\u2019s government also enacted some controversial epidemic and socio-economic\npolicies in response to the crisis that diverged from the conventional\napproaches followed by most developed and emerging countries. The most widely\ndiscussed \u2018unorthodox\u2019 policies include freeing up 50-60% of hospital beds in\nthe midst of the health crisis and maintaining restrictive social policies\nwithout adequate protection for the unemployed, low-income families and\nstudents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How can we understand the political\nconsequences of populist health crisis management in Hungary? The dominant\napproaches to populism emphasize culture and populist political agency (Mudde,\n2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This agency-culture approach sees populism\nas driven by a growing cultural divide between traditionalist nationalists and\ncosmopolitan liberals. Populists exploit this new political cleavage and build\npolitical momentum by attacking the \u2018elite\u2019 and offering to protect the ways of\nlife and interests of the \u2018people,\u2019 and excluding cultural outgroups such as\nmigrants. Populists rely on political movements that are supposed to create a\ndirect link between the leader and the masses, leading to a personalistic,\ncentralized leadership, which questions the role of intermediary organizations\nand bureaucratic expertise (Jansen, 2011; Kriesi, 2014; Weyland, 2017). Often,\npopulism is described as a politics diametrically opposed to liberal policies.\nAs Pappas (2014, p. 12) put it in his much-cited article on populism in Hungary\nand Greece: \u201cOnce the populists came into office, polarization became for them\na much cheaper strategy for the maintenance of power than implementing painful\nliberal reforms.\u201d In sum, based on the agency-culture approach, the\nunconventional nature of populist health crisis management is explained by\npolitical personalism, the rejection of expertise and evidence-based policies,\nand the desire to exclude cultural outgroups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The agency-culture approach has its merits.\nPersonalistic power relations and new cultural-moral hierarchies play an\nessential role in populist politics. However, this approach puts too much\nemphasis on the dysfunctional character of populism, attributing too much\nweight to personalism, as if the irrational whims of the populist leader would\ncompletely explain the consequences of populist power. In this essay, I follow\na political-economic approach to populism (Rodrik, 2018). This approach holds\nthat economics does matter and suggests that populism is in part driven by\ninequality and the fear of status loss among working-class voters. However, the\nmost crucial aspect of populist power is its relation to the elites. Masked by\nanti-elitism, crucial segments of the economic elite might also support\npopulism, which could lead to policies that serve the interests of high-income\ngroups and domestic businesses, while working-class supporters of populist\nparties could be among the biggest victims of populists in power (Bruff, 2014;\nKalb, 2018; Schrecker, 2017).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This essay will distinguish between\ngovernmental policy effectiveness, which is related to how well a given policy\ninstrument addresses a well-defined socio-economic problem, and political\neffectiveness, which is related to political tactics and strategies geared to\nthe stabilization of power. The proponents of the agency-culture approach to\npopulism downplay the policy effectiveness of populists in power \u2013 policies are\ndriven by the whims of populist leaders, leading to policy failure (Dornbusch\n& Edwards, 1990; Houle & Kenny, 2018; Sachs, 1989). They hypothesise\nthat populist policy making is solely politically driven, lacking any\npolicy-strategy or underlying economic-structural logic: \u201cPopulists are not\ncommitted to a systematic ideology or a clear program but govern as they see\nfit, depending on their own tactical considerations, sudden ideas, and even\nwhims; \u2026 thorough program elaboration and careful, systematic implementation\nare often missing.\u201d (Weyland, 2017, p. 60)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While accepting the importance of\n\u2018executive aggrandizement,\u2019 the political-economic approach to populism\nconnects the political and policy logic of populism. Populist policies might\nfollow a well-defined policy logic, and this might reflect the embeddedness of\npopulists in particular elite groups. These policies, therefore, cannot be\ndescribed simply as anti-elitist or anti-scientific, and are not merely the\nproduct of political personalism. Political effectiveness might be a tool to\nveil the policy logic of populist politics, thus allowing for the\nimplementation of unpopular policies that would be politically unsustainable\nunder democratic circumstances. This essay uses the political-economic\nframework to show how Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s socio-economic strategy to build a variety\nof authoritarian capitalism explains the governmental health crisis management.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Populist health crisis management in action<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Health crisis management can be divided\ninto three distinct fields: epidemic responses, socio-economic policies and\npolitical responses. Epidemic responses cover policies designed to mitigate the\ndirect threats on civilian health posed by epidemics such as covid-19.\nSocio-economic policies respond to the social and economic dimension of the\ncrisis, in particular to the repercussions of the lockdown for the revenues of\nbusinesses, and the livelihood and security of families and individuals.\nFinally, political responses include measures that affect democratic procedures\nand the exercise of governmental power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hungary\u2019s government took the first epidemic responses<\/em> belatedly. Hungary started to introduce significant restrictions on 16 March, with a full shelter-in-place order effective from 27 March. Shops, bars and restaurants were ordered to close after 3 pm, public gatherings were banned (with the exception of religious gatherings), and distance learning was introduced in schools. Epidemic measures also included other, less conventional, steps such as the suspension of admission of migrants from transit zones on the southern border, the expulsion of some foreign students, the introduction of centralized military leadership in hospitals, care homes, and companies in the food, health and pharmaceutical sectors producing basic necessities, the complete centralization of testing,[i]<\/sup> and the centralization of the flow of epidemic information.[ii]<\/sup> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The measures that target the restructuring of hospitals are particularly controversial. On 11 March, the government decided to freeze all non-coronavirus related admissions to hospitals and treatments with the exception of life-saving ones (\u00be of hospital treatments was postponed in the only hospital that provided detailed data about the effect of this measure.[iii]<\/sup> If the hospital admissions remain restricted in the following months, it could allow the government to save around 10 billion forints on hospitals in the midst of the pandemic. On 9 April, the minister responsible for health ordered publicly funded hospitals to free up 60% of hospital beds  by 19 April for the treatment of expected new coronavirus patients.[iv]<\/sup> Hospital directors who refuse to fully comply are threatened and  two renowned hospital directors were dismissed.[v]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, as most countries in Central and Eastern Europe,[vi]<\/sup> Hungary managed to avoid a mass outbreak. Central and Eastern European countries are less connected into global movements (tourism, migration, businesses); therefore, the first cases appeared later, allowing time to prepare, and leaving more room for error. After the first weeks of hesitation and confusion, the epidemic responses of the government were overall adequate \u2013 though there remain critical problems with regard to infections in hospitals and care homes. As of 4 May, there were 3,065 detected coronavirus cases in Hungary, with 363 deaths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government\u2019s socio-economic responses<\/em> were more belated and highly selective. The thrust of the government\u2019s economic measures is dedicated to alleviating the financial burden of businesses in some sectors (tourism, catering, leisure, sport, culture and personal taxi services). On 8 April, the government established the anti-Epidemic Protection Fund (663 bn forints = \u20ac1.89 bn)[vii]<\/sup> and the Economy Protection Fund (1345 bn forints = \u20ac3.83 bn). This fund was sourced by reallocating resources from ministries and from the Employment Fund, by cutting local government budgets, and implementing two somewhat symbolic taxes, a new financial tax on banks in the value 55 billion forints (\u20ac0.16 bn), and a new tax on retail chains in the value of 36 bn forints (\u20ac0.1 bn).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the government aims to keep the\nbudget deficit below 2.7% for 2020, which amounts to a strict austerity policy,\ngiven that the projected increase in the budget deficit is much smaller than\nthe drop in the GDP, which could even reach 10% by the end of the year. This\nmacroeconomic conservativism diverges from the approach of most other\ngovernments and the recommendations of international institutions. The EU has\nsuspended the 3% deficit rule, and most governments, including conservative\ngovernments inject significant hard money into the economy through deficit\nfinancing. The central bank led by Gy\u00f6rgy Matolcsy follows a more conventional\neconomic response by significantly boosting private lending and buying government\nbonds on the secondary market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The responses in the fields of social and employment<\/em> policy<\/em> are particularly restrictive and\nbelated. Even conservative governments recognize the need to increase spending\non social security in response to the coronavirus health crisis but Viktor\nOrb\u00e1n\u2019s government refuses to do so. The only significant policy response\nalleviating the financial burden of workers is a limited wage guarantee scheme\nintroduced on 8 April. The government covers up to 70% (later increased to 75%)\nof the lost salary for workers whose work time was reduced by up to 50% (later\nincreased to 75%). The government also pledged to increase the public works\nprogramme in response to the crisis, which currently employs around 80,000\npeople, and to offer extended training and education opportunities for the\nunemployed; however, these plans are yet to materialize. To help companies in\nfinding \u2018flexible solutions,\u2019 on 18 March the government effectively suspended\nthe labor code (Bruszt, 2020). This allows companies to diverge from\nregulations with regard to work time, workplace arrangements, and the minimum\nwage threshold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, the political responses<\/em> to the health crisis also include several\nhighly controversial measures. Although the centralization of executive power\nis a common approach in crisis management, the Hungarian government went\nfurther than most other democratic governments. In a widely discussed move, the\nNational Assembly, relying on the qualified majority of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s Fidesz party,\npassed an act that made the previously introduced state of emergency indefinite\nand allowed Orb\u00e1n to rule by decree, postponing by-elections and national and\nlocal referendums, and curtailing public scrutiny by making the spreading of\n\u2018misleading information\u2019 about the government\u2019s pandemic response punishable by\nup to five years in prison. Although the special powers to rule by decree are\nphased out in June, some emergency regulations remain in place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A few days after the introduction of rule\nby decree, the government cut the funding of political parties by half, under\nthe pretext of reallocating money to the coronavirus responses. The 1.2 billion\nforints (\u20ac3.42 million) reallocated is little compared to the budget of the\ncrisis funds, but it effectively hinders the operation of opposition parties\nthat overwhelmingly rely on state funding as a source of revenue. Bolstered by\ntheir oligarchs and the political use of governmental resources, this cut does\nnot affect Fidesz. The central government also reduced the budget of local\ngovernments by centralizing road tax revenues, with further selective punitive\nfinancial measurers targeting communities controlled by the opposition (e.g.\nG\u00f6d, Budapest District IX). The government also refuses to engage in any\nmeaningful dialogue with the parties of the opposition and with social\nstakeholders such as trade unions, although communication with business\nadvocacy organizations is regular.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Populist health crisis management in the context of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s authoritarian capitalist strategy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

How can we interpret the characteristic\nsteps of the Hungarian government to tackle the pandemic? As laid out in the\nintroduction, the agency-culture approach to populism describes populist\npolicymaking as a divergence from the principles of good governance, which is\nbound to be counterproductive and lead to policy failure. Populist policies are\nthus ineffective, a sole result of political effectiveness, that is, the\nover-centralization of personalistic power. Populist governments attempt to\nstabilize power through maximizing political efficiency and neglecting policy\nefficiency. This perspective can explain some policy choices of the government.\nThe early decision to entirely suspend the admission of migrants from transit\nzones and to expel some Iranian students fits populist politics targeting the\nexclusion of cultural outgroups. The avoidance of mass testing might also be\ninterpreted as an approach driven by political considerations to avoid the\nspread of panic. The introduction of military leadership in hospitals and the\nmilitarization of streets also fit this approach. These steps might be\ncharacterized as inefficient pandemic response policies driven by political\npersonalism and the centralization of power. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the agency-culture approach seems\nto be less capable of explaining the most controversial epidemic,\nsocio-economic and political responses. The political-economic approach to\npopulism emphasizes the economic-structural relations of populist power as an\nexplanation of populist policy making. This suggests that populist policy\nmaking might serve a hidden agenda, masked by populist politics and discourses.\nThe relationship between populist politics and policy is therefore explained by\nthe political-economic background of populist power holders. Although from a\nsocial-scientific perspective it might be premature to uncover deeper social\nmechanisms from the crisis experience, I propose that the political-economic\napproach to populism is capable of elucidating the underlying mechanisms of\npopulist health crisis responses, as I already have tentatively suggested\nelsewhere (Scheiring, 2020a).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following a political-economic approach to\nilliberal populist governance in Hungary between 2010 and 2018, I have shown\nthat Viktor Orb\u00e1n did not dismantle democratic institutions because he is\nmerely power-hungry and driven by populist whims (Scheiring, 2019, 2020c).\nViktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s illiberal regime follows a discernible political-economic logic\nthat arose in response to the tensions induced by dependent development in\nEurope\u2019s semi-periphery. Hungary\u2019s international economic integration led to an\ninternal economic disintegration that polarized the capitalist class and\nengendered the revolt of the national capitalists. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This led to the collapse of the class compromise\nbetween political technocrats and transnational capital that had sustained the\npre-2010 liberal state. Fidesz utilized this opportunity to build a new\nauthoritarian capitalist regime and facilitate a new class coalition comprising\nthe national and transnational capital and the nationalist faction of the\npolitical class. Although Orb\u00e1n rode the waves of working-class disillusionment\nwith globalization to get elected (Scheiring, 2020b), his socio-economic\npolicies frequently lead to further working-class dislocation and\ndisenfranchisement (Szikra, 2018). It is crucial to recognize that neither\nnational nor international capitalists have risen up to challenge Orb\u00e1n\u2019s\nilliberalism. This is because national capitalists are better off than any time\nbefore, while major transnational corporations in the technological sectors,\nsuch as German car manufacturers, are also crucial pillars of Hungary\u2019s\nauthoritarian capitalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I have shown that the socio-economic\npolicies of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s illiberal state are designed to serve the interests of the\nclass coalition on which it is built. The primary economic objective of the\ngovernment is to facilitate the embourgeoisement of the upper-middle class and\naccelerate the capital accumulation of the national bourgeoisie and the\ntransnational capitalists in the export-oriented tech sectors. In order to\nachieve this goal, the government fundamentally transformed education, social,\nemployment, and fiscal policies. These transformations are socially costly,\nhurting large segments of society, from members of the working class to small\nand medium-sized entrepreneurs to urban liberal middle classes. A recent survey\nconducted before the coronavirus pandemic \nasking respondents to evaluate the ten years of the Orb\u00e1n regime\nreported that 43% of Hungarians think that the country is in a worse state than\nit was in 2010, and only 30% saw an improvement (B\u00edr\u00f3 Nagy & Laki, 2020).\nAs a result of its unpopular socio-economic policies, Orb\u00e1n\u2019s government lost a\nlarge share of its working-class supporters between 2010-2014. At the 2014\nparliamentary election, Fidesz received fewer votes than in 2006, when they\nlost and ended up in the opposition. The 2019 local governmental elections\nagain showed that Orb\u00e1n\u2019s illiberal hegemony is vulnerable, as the opposition\nwas able to take hold of critical large cities throughout the country,\nincluding the capital. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s Fidesz does not rely on an\noverwhelming electoral majority. The stability of the regime depends in part on\nthe institutional authoritarianism and authoritarian populism it employs\n(Scheiring & Szombati, 2020). To pre-empt a possible political backlash\nemanating from the losers of the government\u2019s socio-economic strategy and to\nhinder the politicization of diffuse social unrest, Fidesz curtailed the\ninstitutions of liberal democracy. In other words, Orb\u00e1n\u2019s authoritarianism is,\nin part, a corollary to the acceleration of capital accumulation and the embourgeoisement\nof the upper-middle class. This political-economic framework allows us to\nunderstand the government\u2019s most controversial responses to the coronavirus\nhealth crisis. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government\u2019s socio-economic responses\nextend on its social policy strategy followed in the past decade, applying the\nsame principles and targeting the same socio-economic goals. After 2010,\nOrb\u00e1n\u2019s government fundamentally transformed the welfare state. Spending on\nsocial protection was slashed from 18.1% of the GDP in 2009 to 13.3% in 2018\n(Eurostat, 2020a) \u2013 an unprecedented reduction in Europe after the financial\ncrisis. The government shifted from needs-based benefits to workfare-based\nbenefits, as part of a broader paradigmatic shift from the welfare state to the\nworkfare state. The government reduced the duration of the unemployment benefit\nto 3 months, which is the lowest in Europe. The allowance equals to 60% of the\nprevious average pay, but the amount cannot be higher than 100% of the minimum\nwage (i.e. 149,000 forints = \u20ac425). It is widely recognized that three months\nare far from enough to find a new job after becoming unemployed, especially\nduring a crisis. The government cut several forms of benefits, reduced the\npublic works salary below the minimum wage, and significantly reduced the value\nof social assistance. Once the job-seeker benefit expires after 90 days,\ncitizens are entitled to employment substituting benefits of about 22,800\nforints a month (\u20ac65).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The cuts to social spending allowed the government to maintain a budget deficit well below 3% throughout the last decade. The new constitution in effect since 2012 contains a clause that mandates governments to follow a restrictive fiscal policy if state debt is above 50% of the GDP.[viii]<\/sup><\/a> Orb\u00e1n\u2019s illiberal state freed up so much money from social protection that it was able to significantly increase public investments that benefit the national bourgeoisie and to launch new pro-natalist family policies that help the embourgeoisement of the upper-middle class. As a consequence of these policies that redistribute resources from the bottom to the top, income inequality has skyrocketed in Hungary after 2010. Hungary is now the most unequal country in the Visegr\u00e1d region.[ix]<\/sup> The number of people in severe poverty earning less than 40% of the median wage grew dramatically, from 197,000 persons (2% of the population) in 2010 to 478,000 persons (5%).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These policies are reflected in the way the government\u2019s socio-economic policies have responded to the coronavirus health crisis. With the exception of a restrictive wage guarantee scheme and the freezing of loan payments, the state does not provide any new benefits that would go beyond the existing limited, workfarist social policy model. A close political ally of the government, L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Parragh, the Chairman of the Hungarian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, summed up the government\u2019s philosophy candidly in an interview, stating that \u2018so many people have gone broke, that we cannot do anything about this<\/em>.\u2019[x]<\/sup> Viktor Orb\u00e1n himself repeatedly refused to extend social assistance and pledged to uphold the government\u2019s workfarist approach,[xi]<\/sup> which in essence implies no one receives income from the state who is otherwise capable of working.[xii]<\/sup> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government\u2019s most controversial epidemic response, the mandatory reduction of hospital beds, also fits the health policy of the illiberal state. Firstly, freeing up 39,500 beds, about 60% of all hospital beds, seems to be a gross overestimation of potential coronavirus cases. On 9 April, when the decree was announced, there were around 100 patients infected with the coronavirus treated in hospitals and around 1,000 detected cases. Freeing up 60% of the beds would be only required if there are 180-230 thousand actively infected people in Hungary, which was much higher than the actual numbers, and exceeded the number of infected people even in Italy, a country with six times Hungary\u2019s population. Experts estimate that the reduction of hospital beds might have affected around 15,000 people who were previously being treated in hospitals and were sent home overnight without adequate home care services.[xiii]<\/sup> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Public health care spending declined from 5.2% of GDP in 2009, a level already low in international comparison, to 4.7% in 2018. The dilapidated state of public hospitals is a frequent topic of newspapers and public debates. People find the declining quality of health care the most worrying, with 57% of Hungarians highlighting the state of health care as the most significant problem (B\u00edr\u00f3 Nagy & Laki, 2020).[xiv]<\/sup> Based on the Euro Health Consumer Index, the quality of the Hungarian health system is the third lowest in Europe, primarily as a consequence of the underfunding of the public health system (Bj\u00f6rnberg & Phang, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In contrast to education and social policy,\nOrb\u00e1n has so far shied away from a full-blown restructuring of the health care\nsystem. As part of the last wave of avant-garde neoliberal reforms (Appel &\nOrenstein, 2018; Korkut, 2012), the last Socialist-Liberal government between\n2006-2010 attempted to liberalize health insurance, decrease the number of\nhospital beds and introduce co-payment. At that time, Orb\u00e1n took a strong\nstance against these commodifying reforms, initiating a referendum that he won\nby a landslide. This referendum was a significant blow to the government and an\nimportant stepping stone for Orb\u00e1n towards conquering the state. This highly\npoliticized conflict did not allow Orb\u00e1n to take a complete U-turn in health\npolicy. However, the cuts to public hospitals served as an incentive for\nwell-off citizens to join private health insurance companies and seek treatment\nin private hospitals and clinics. The group of national capitalists supporting\nOrb\u00e1n from the background includes several billionaires active in the health\nsector. The upper-middle class, on which Orb\u00e1n heavily relies, is also not\ninterested in funding a universal public health system as they are better off\nwith their private providers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is too early to conclude that reduction in hospital beds is part of a long-term programme of health care austerity serving the expansion of private health-care providers. However, recent statements by the government provide clues that this might, in fact, be the reason behind the drastic reduction of hospital beds. At a press conference at the end of last year, Gergely Guly\u00e1s, Minister of the Prime Minister\u2019s Office, indicated that transforming hospitals is on the agenda of the government, stating that the recurring public debts of (underfunded) hospitals is a severe problem for which hospital directors will be held responsible.[xv]<\/sup> The ministry responsible for health prepared a reform proposal at the beginning of 2020 that also referred to the need to reduce the number of hospital beds.[xvi]<\/sup> This reform process was temporarily put on hold by the coronavirus. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, it seems likely that the government wants to seize on the health crisis to push ahead with a restructuring of hospitals. At a more recent press conference, Gergely Guly\u00e1s said \u201cas the coronavirus crisis also highlighted, we have to rethink health finance \u2026 it is unnecessary to maintain hospital capacities that are not justified by the number of patients.\u201d<\/em>[xvii]<\/sup> This response suggests a long-term plan to restructure hospitals, which is consistent with the elimination of 3,000 hospital beds that already took place between 2010 and 2018. Based on this statement it is likely that hospitals will not return to the same number of beds as before. In short, it seems likely that the government will use the crisis to implement another potentially unpopular reform that would  otherwise be very difficult to push through under normal democratic circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is reasonable to conclude that the government\u2019s most controversial policies in response to the coronavirus are not merely the product of irrational populist whims or the desire to exclude cultural outgroups. It would also be difficult to characterize these measures as anti-elitist, fiscally irresponsible steps designed to buy the support of popular masses. Hence, the most common tropes in the literature on populism especially characteristic of the agency-culture approach do not capture the essence of populist health crisis management in Hungary. In this essay, I have proposed a political-economic approach to populism and showed how this framework allows us to better understand how seemingly disjointed and inefficient policies of the government are part of a strategy. There is a discernible policy logic behind the government\u2019s responses that fit well into its socio-economic strategy, geared towards social welfare divestment, labor flexibilization, and redistribution towards the upper-middle class and the national bourgeoisie. The coronavirus health crisis is just another opportunity to push ahead with this agenda and restrict democracy and political competition further to prevent a backlash from the victims of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s illiberal populism. Authoritarian capitalism is a robust framework to understand the consequences of populist health crisis management in Hungary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

G\u00e1bor Scheiring is a Marie Curie Fellow at Bocconi University, Milan, researching the social consequences of economic globalisation, the political economy of health and populism. His book, <\/em>The Retreat of Liberal Democracy (Palgrave, 2020) analyses how global economic transformation gave rise to illiberal populism in Hungary. He served as a member of the Hungarian Parliament between 2010\u20132014.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Endnotes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

[i] Hungary carried out the fourth lowest number of diagnostic tests in the OECD until the end of April. See https:\/\/read.oecd-ilibrary.org\/view\/?ref=129_129658-l62d7lr66u&title=Testing-for-COVID-19-A-way-to-lift-confinement-restrictions<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ii] Hospitals, care homes are not allowed to respond to queries independently to the state of emergency related to the coronavirus, all communication goes through the central government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[iii] https:\/\/merce.hu\/2020\/05\/04\/91-korhazbol-1-volt-hajlando-elarulni-hany-mutetet-halasztottak-el-a-jarvanyhelyzet-miatt\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[iv] This was reduced to 50% a few days later \u2013 while reaching 60% was postponed to an indefinite second phase. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[v] There was a solidarity demonstration in one the cases where a widely respected director was fired, to no avail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[vi] https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/f9850a8d-7323-4de5-93ed-9ecda7f6de1c<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[vii] All conversions in this essay are calculated with the exchange rate on 5 May.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[viii] State debt in 2019 reached 66.3% of the GDP \u2013 continuously decreasing since 2012.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ix] The Gini coefficient jumped from 24.1 in 2010 to 28.7 in 2018 while every other Visegr\u00e1d country saw a decline (Eurostat, 2020b). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[x] https:\/\/nepszava.hu\/3073892_parragh-laszlo-annyi-ember-ment-es-megy-tonkre-hogy-ezzel-nem-tudunk-mit-kezdeni<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xi] Orb\u00e1n has called it the \u2018work-based society\u2019 in his famous illiberalism-speech on 26 July 2014: https:\/\/www.kormany.hu\/en\/the-prime-minister\/the-prime-minister-s-speeches\/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xii] \u2018I want to tell every Hungarian citizen that they will not get any social assistance if they are capable of working.\u2019 Speech at the meeting of the National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers, 26 July 2012. http:\/\/2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu\/beszed\/ne_kapjon_segelyt_aki_munkakepes<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xiii] https:\/\/index.hu\/belfold\/2020\/04\/18\/koronavirus_egeszsegugy_korhazak_kiuritese_emmi_agyak_felszabaditasa\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xiv] It is also worth noting that people named inequalities as the second most worrying problem according to the survey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xv] The overwhelming majority of hospitals in Hungary does not have enough resources to cover basic operational costs like buying syringes or masks; hospitals are constantly operating on the verge of insolvency. See https:\/\/g7.hu\/kozelet\/20200323\/tulterhelt-penzugyileg-kivereztetett-magyar-korhazakra-szakadt-ra-a-jarvany\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xvi] https:\/\/weborvos.hu\/lapszemle\/ime-a-kormany-egeszsegugyi-reformcsomagja-257300<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xvii] https:\/\/www.portfolio.hu\/gazdasag\/20200423\/kiderult-a-koronavirus-miatti-korhazi-agyszamcsokkentes-valodi-hattere-427870<\/a> <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

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<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by G\u00e1bor Scheiring, Marie Curie Fellow, Bocconi University, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy Abstract How can we interpret the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":289,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[61878,18694],"tags":[15613,50915,61850],"class_list":["post-6615","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-democracy-seminar","category-events-news","tag-democracy","tag-hungary","tag-pandemos"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6615","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/users\/289"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6615"}],"version-history":[{"count":17,"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6615\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6654,"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6615\/revisions\/6654"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6615"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6615"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs-test.newschool.edu\/tcds\/wpjson\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6615"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}